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Certification of Juveniles To
Adult Court
JOSEPH N. SORRENTINO
and GARY K. OLSEN*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a separate system of juvenile justice is em-
bedded in the nation's law. Growing out of the progressive so-
cial movements at the turn of the century,1 the effort to correct
the abuses of incarcerating children with adult criminals gained
rapid acceptance throughout the United States. By 1929, every
state, the federal government, and the District of Columbia had
* Joseph N. Sorrentino, BA University of California, Santa Barbara, 1963;
MA University of California, Los Angeles, 1970; JD Harvard Law School, 1967;
Juvenile Court Referee, Los Angeles County, 1975; Private Practice 1970 to
present. Author of: UP FROM NEVER, (1971) THE MORAL REVOLUTION, (1972) THE
CONCRETE CRADLE, (1975) Gary K. Olsen, BA University of Santa Clara, 1966;
J.D. University of California, Davis, 1969; Diploma in International Law with
distinction, City of London College, London, England, 1968; Staff Disciplinary
Attorney, State Bar of California, Los Angeles; Private practice with Olsen and
Sorrentino 1972, handling over 300 juvenile court cases to date.
1. The forerunner of the early juvenile codes was the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act of 1899.
created a special body of laws-a juvenile code-designed to
meet the peculiar problems and needs of youth.2
Today American juvenile codes vary considerably in the na-
ture and extent of the services they offer to juveniles and in the
form of the institutions which dispense those services. Some
states, like California,3 establish an entire system of juvenile
courts and agencies with their own facilities and permanent,
full-time staff; others, like Florida,4 merely carve out special
powers and procedures for courts of general jurisdiction hear-
ing matters pertaining to juveniles.5 These differences, how-
ever, are slight when viewed in light of those things which the
juvenile codes have long had in common. For example, the
concept of Parens pattie,6 under which the state may assume
toward the juvenile the protective and guiding role of parent,7 is
fundamental to all juvenile codes. Above all, juvenile laws share
the conviction that children are essentially good, that therefore
treatment and rehabilitation must replace the emphasis on guilt
and punishment which exists in adult criminal proceedings, and
that the primary purpose of these laws is to secure the welfare
and best interests of the child.8
Another shared characteristic not often considered in com-
paring the juvenile codes is the fact that practically all such
codes contain some provision empowering a court to exclude a
criminally-accused minor from the juvenile system and subject
him to the normal course of criminal prosecution as an adult.
Variously termed "transfer," "referral," "certification" or
2. M. LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A STUDY OF THE JUVENILE
CODES IN THE UNITED STATES (1974) (hereinafter cited as LEVIN & SARRI). For a
history of the juvenile reform movement, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 500, et seq. (West 1961).
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(1) (West 1973).
5. A survey of the structural diversity among juvenile courts may be found
in LEVIN & SARRI, supra note 2. 37-47.
6. The term means "parent of the country."
7. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909) summarizes the
legal foundations of the juvenile system. See also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967).
8. The philosophy of the juvenile system is set forth in its most authorita-
tive form in the preambles or statements of purpose of the juvenile codes
themselves. Indiana's statute is typical and reads as follows:
The purpose of this act is to secure for each child within its provisions
such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will
serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the state; and when
such child is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given by his parents.
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-1 (1971).
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"waiver of jurisdiction,"9 this process is, in some states, as old as
the juvenile system itself.10 Nonetheless, the transfer issue did
not come into prominence until 1966 when the United States
Supreme Court decided Kent v. United States." In that case,
the Court held that the decision whether to transfer a child to
the criminal courts or to retain him within the juvenile system is
"critically important" 12 to the preservation of the accused
juvenile's rights and to the outcome of his case; therefore, the
minor is entitled to a hearing at which he is represented by
counsel, to access by his counsel to the social records and re-
ports considered by the juvenile court, and to a statement in the
record of the reasons for the court's decision. 13 Unfortunately,
from the standpoint of the accused juvenile, the term "critical"
barely describes the importance of the transfer decision, for if
convicted, the minor not only loses the privileges of juvenile
status, but faces the severe consequences of treatment as an
adult. Thus,
There is convincing evidence that most juvenile court personnel, and
the judges themselves, regard the waiver of jurisdiction as the most
severe sanction that may be imposed by the juvenile court. Not only is
the juvenile exposed to the probability of severe punishment, but the
confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile proceeding is re-
placed by the publicity and normative concepts of penal law; the child
acquires a public arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will
inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium attached thereto
by prospective employers; if convicted as an adult, the child may be
detained well past his twenty-first birthday; he may lose certain civil
rights and be disqualified from public employment. Moreover, if sent
to a typical adult prison, he is likely to be subjected to physical, and
9. This article follows the common practice of using the terms inter-
changeably, although perhaps technically they should not be.
The court is not "waiving" some right or power; rather it is considering
retention of jurisdiction. Only on the findings of a hearing does it
transfer the case, which it does by certifying that certain criteria have
been met and that consequently the criminal court is empowered to
take jurisdiction.
Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Transfer of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement,
8 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 3,4 (1962), quoted in Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction
in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding, Its Role in the Administra-
tion of Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 KENTUCKY
L. J. 122, 141 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stamm].
10. E.g., Kentucky's transfer law was part of its first juvenile code in 1906.
1906 Ky. Acts ch. 64. Stamm, supra, note 9 at 125.
11. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
12. Id. at 553.
13. Id. at 561.
499
even sexual abuse by older inmates, and his chances for rehabilitation
are likely to decrease significantly.
14
The transfer decision is important not only to the juvenile, but
also to lawyers and citizens concerned with juvenile justice be-
cause it sets at odds the conflicting demands which society
places on the juvenile and criminal systems-treatment and
rehabilitation on the one hand, and society's protection from
and punishment of the adult criminal on the other. The transfer
decision involves the paradox: will the juvenile court be unable
or unwilling to extend its special powers and services to one of
the class of persons for whom these special powers and services
were created?15 Thus, the question of transfer touches the pur-
pose and object of the juvenile justice system, and its resolution
greatly affects the nature of that system.
At present, forty-seven states,16 the federal government,17 and
the District of Columbia 8 have enacted statutes vesting juvenile
court judges with discretion to transfer juveniles accused of
crime to adult court. Only three states19 have no provision au-
thorizing the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction.
14. Shornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisted,
43 IND. L. J. 583, 586-587 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Shornhorst]. Shornhorst
figuratively characterizes certification as a sentence of "death" as a juvenile.
Another commentator would regard this characterization literally: " . . . if the
death penalty is successfully resurrected, the transfer hearing may in some
cases be described as terminal." Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy
Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1974). See also Stamm,
supra, note 9 at 143.
15. Stamm, supra, note 9 at 145.
16. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1971); Ariz. Juv.
Ct. R. 12, 14 (Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-108 (Supp. 1969); Del. Fam. Ct.
R. 170 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5) (West Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-
2501 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-22 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (Supp.
1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Supp. 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14
(Burns Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (West 1969); KAN. STAT. § 38.808
(Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:1571.1 (West 1951); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2611(3) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
26, § 70-16 (Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-33 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.071 (Vernon 1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1229 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62.080 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.21 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 4-
48 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-27 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26
(Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10. § 1112(b) (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.533
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-17 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE §§ 15-1281.12 to .13 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-11-4 (Supp.
1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234 (Supp. 1971); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02
(Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-86 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE. § 16.1-176
(Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.120 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3 (1965); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. § 14-115.38 (Supp. 1971).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1969).
18. D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (Supp. 1972).
19. Vermont does not provide for transfer of cases originally brought in the
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This article surveys the current laws governing transfer of
juveniles to criminal court. With the possible exception of the
recently enacted California certification statute20 which serves
juvenile court. But where a child is transferred from the criminal court to the
juvenile court, the latter may retransfer the case upon a finding that the child is
not in need of juvenile treatment and rehabilitation. Since it appears that re-
transfer occurs after the child has been found guilty by the criminal court, the
juvenile court proceeding violates the rule of Breed v. Jones (see text accom-
panying note 111, infra) and is unconstitutional. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 655
(1973).
In Nebraska the county attorney, not the juvenile court, decides whether the
child may be tried as an adult. But the child may petition the criminal court for
transfer back to the juvenile system. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202.1-.2 (1971).
New York has no transfer statute. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30 (McKinney 1909) states
that no criminal responsibility attaches to acts of those under the age of 16 at the
time of commission. Thus, criminal acts of those 16 and over are prosecuted in
adult court.
20. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1976). In any case in which a
minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the
violation, when he was 16 years or age or older, of any criminal statute or
ordinance except those listed in subdivision (a) upon motion of the petitioner
made prior to the attachment of jeopardy the court shall cause the probation
officer to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social
history of the minor being considered for unfitness. Following submission and
consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence which the peti-
tioner or the minor may wish to submit the juvenile court may find that the
minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law
if it concludes that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and
training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court, based
upon an evaluation of the following criteria:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged to have been com-
mitted by the minor.
A determination that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law may be based on any one or a combination of the
factors set forth above, which shall be recited in the order of unfitness. In any
case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to this section, the court shall
postpone the taking of a plea to the petition until the conclusion of the fitness
hearing, and no plea which may already have been entered shall constitute
evidence at such hearing.
(b) In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Section
602 by reason of the violation, when he was 16 years of age or older, one of the
following offenses: (1) Murder; (2) Arson of an inhabited building; (3) Robbery
while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon; (4) Rape with force or violence
or threat of great bodily harm; (5) Kidnapping for ransom; (6) Kidnapping for
purpose of robbery; (7) Kidnapping with bodily harm; (8) Assault with intent
to murder or attempted murder; (9) Assault with a firearm or destructive device;
as a point of reference for many of the current (but not always
desirable) trends in this rapidly-changing area,21 this article
does not examine any one of these statutes in great depth. Fur-
thermore, it does not attempt an exhaustive theoretical analysis
of the many complex issues involved generally in the certifica-
tion process.22 Instead, this article adopts a broad perspective,
highlighting important problems and providing a background
for further consideration of these and other issues. The discus-
sion begins with an overview of the transfer laws, including a
look at the distinction between legislative and judicial waiver
and a description of the minimum age and offense requirements
which bring the laws into operation. It then focuses upon the
(10) Assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily harm; (11)
Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building, upon motion of
the petitioner made prior to the attachment of jeopardy the court shall cause the
probation officer to investigate and submit a report on the behavioral patterns
and social history of the minor being considered for unfitness. Following sub-
mission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence
which the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit the juvenile court shall
find that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law unless it concludes that the minor would be amenable to the
care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the
juvenile court based upon an evaluation of the following criteria:
(i) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, and
(ii) Whether minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court's jurisdiction, and
(iii) The minor's previous delinquent history, and
(iv) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor, and
(v) The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged to have been com-
mitted by the minor.
A determination that the minor is a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the juvenile court law shall be based on a finding of amenability after
consideration of the criteria set forth above, and reasons therefore shall be
recited in the order. In any case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to
this section, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the petition until the
conclusion of the fitness hearing and no plea which may already have been
entered shall constitute evidence at such hearing.
21. The transfer laws have been the object of much recent state legislative
activity. Thirty-nine states have enacted revisions within the past ten years,
thirty-two within the past five. Only eight of the states having transfer laws-
Alabama, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina
and South Dakota-have not revised them within the past ten years.
22. See Schornhorst, supra note 14 and Stamm, supra note 9. The Stamm
article presents a collection of the literature of waiver of jurisdiction in juvenile
court, note 10 at 128. For analysis of the certification procedure in California,
see Note, Separating the Criminal From the Delinquent: Due Process in the
Certification Procedure, 40 So. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1967); Note, Certification of
Minors to the Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study, 8 S.D.L. REV. 404 (1971);
Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juvenile
Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874 (1972); Clayman, Fitness-The Critical Hearing of
the Juvenile Court, 50 L.A.B. BULL. 129 (1975); Note, Juveniles in the Criminal
Courts: Substantive Views of the Fitness Decision, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 988
(1976); THOMPSON, JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK (1972).
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substantive standards of criteria created by the statutes to guide
the juvenile court in making the certification decision and sum-
marizes some of the major criticisms of these standards. The
final discussion deals with what occurs during and after certifi-
cation, e.g., requirements of notice, standard of proof at the
hearing, rights of appeal and attempts to preserve certain
privileges of juvenile status following adjudication in adult
court. The conclusion offers observations regarding significant
trends and suggested improvements.
OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSFER LAWS
Legislative Waiver
In a minority of states it is the legislature, not the juvenile
court, which determines whether a juvenile will be tried in crim-
inal court. Called "legislative waiver"2 3 such cases in fact do not
involve a waiver of jurisdiction at all; rather, the legislature
merely excludes the accused child from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Commencing with the filing of charges, all pro-
ceedings under such systems occur as if the defendant were an
adult. Most often this form of transfer is utilized when a juvenile
is charged with a specified crime, ranging from murder 24 to
"aggravated delinquency. ' 25 Some states withhold juvenile
court jurisdiction as to youths charged with any crime punish-
able by death 26 or life imprisonment. 27
Certainly, the object of legislative waiver is to circumvent the
certification hearing in the juvenile court and facilitate an
otherwise complex and time consuming process. Nonetheless,
while it may appear an efficient means of responding to the
alarming increase in juvenile crime,28 its cost to society is meas-
ured by the inherent admission that certain children cannot be
23. Schornhorst, supra note 14 at 596.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
25. KAN. STAT. § 21-3611(3) (1964).
26. The abolition of capital punishment has not invalidated these provi-
sions. See, e.g., Lycans v. Borden Kircher, 222 S.E. 2d 14 (W. Va. 1975).
27. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1570(A) (5) (West 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7A-280 (1969); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3 (1973).
28. Almost 60% of all persons charged with burglarly in 1974 were under
eighteen years of age. Juveniles comprised 34% of those accused of robbery, 23%
of those accused of rape. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1974 (1975).
helped. The only interest served in such cases is the public's
need for protection from these children.
This problem becomes more troubling in view of the fact that
often such legislative waiver statutes contain no minimum age
provision. Consequently, any child who comes under these laws
must stand trial in criminal court regardless of age. Indiana, for
example, has recently enacted a legislative waiver statute2 9
which redefines "child" by excluding from that class all persons
charged with first degree murder, thus making possible the
tragic and absurd result that a ten year old could be tried in
criminal court and, if convicted, be imprisoned with adults.30
Judicial Waiver
The great majority of laws governing transfer call for an
exercise of discretion on the part of the juvenile court. These
laws usually include standards to guide the judge in reaching
his decision. Most also provide that before a juvenile may be
certified for transfer, he must meet certain minimum standards
regarding his age and the offense charged.
Minimum Age Requirement
In nine jurisdictions 3 1 no minimum age is stated. Theoretical-
ly, any child, no matter how young, may be prosecuted as as
adult. More commonly, however, a minimum age is set which
approaches the upper age limit of the juvenile court's juris-
diction. Thus, in sixteen state and federal jurisdictions,32 includ-
ing California, a child must be at least sixteen before transfer
can occur; in seven jurisdictions,33 the minimum age is fifteen;
thirteen states34 have a minimum age of fourteen; and in Illinois
and Mississippi, the minimum age is thirteen. In several states
the minimum age varies with the offense charged. In Tennessee,
for example, a child is normally eligible for transfer if he is
sixteen or older.35 However, a child charged with murder, rape,
29. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-3 (Supp. 1975).
30. See Notes, Survey of Recent Developments, 9 IND. L. REV. 197, 234
(1975).
31. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
32. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Wisconsin and the federal government.
33. District of Columbia, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Texas,
Vermont.
34. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah.
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-234 (Supp. 1971).
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robbery with a deadly weapon and kidnapping may be trans-
ferred at the age of fifteen. Indiana makes a similar provision in
its law, except that the minimum age for serious offenses drops
from sixteen to fourteen.36 In Maryland the minimum age re-
quirement, normally fourteen years, is dropped entirely where
there are charges punishable by death or life imprisonment.
3 7
South Carolina's minimum age of fourteen years is omitted
where the juvenile is accused of one of an assortment of
specified crimes including murder, perjury and larceny.38
Nine states have amended their minimum age provisions
within the past ten years. Indiana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and Virginia have increased the minimum age by one to two
years, while Connecticut, Hawaii and Illinois have moved from
no minimum age to age requirements of fourteen to sixteen
years. The trend toward a higher minimum age may indicate a
desire that the transfer process be restricted to-or focused
upon those older juveniles who are nearing the age limit of the
juvenile's court's original jurisdiction39 and will soon automati-
cally face prosecution as adults. For example, West Virginia has
replaced a fixed minimum age (sixteen) in favor of an indefinite
standard (below eighteen years), but only the District of Colum-
bia has lowered its minimum age requirement (from sixteen to
fifteen years old). Thus while the juvenile's age is not, and
should not be,40 the sole factor to be considered in making the
transfer decision, its importance has increased in the past few
years.
A significant problem with the minimum age element of the
transfer decision is the lack of agreement among the states as to
which event should be looked to to establish the significant age.
Although twenty-five41 jurisdictions having a minimum age re-
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1972).
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-16 (Supp. 1971).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1281.12 (1962).
39. In approximately two-thirds of the states this age limit is eighteen years;
nowhere is it less than sixteen. Note, Certification of Minors to the Juvenile
Court: An Empirical Study, 8 S.D.L. REV. 404, 411 (1971).
40. In a survey of juvenile court judges in Arizona, most thought that age,
by itself, should not be a sufficient reason to transfer a juvenile. Juvenile in
America: Special Project, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 315 note 129 (1974).
41. California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
quirement look to the juvenile's age at the time of the commis-
sion of the alleged offense, fourteen 42 consider the age at the
time of the filing of charges or the time of the waiver proceed-
ings. Thus, in Michigan,43 where the minimum age for transfer is
fifteen, a child fourteen years old at the time of the wrongful act
may be transferred if his birthday occurs before he is ap-
prehended and charged. This enables the imaginative prosecu-
tor to circumvent the juvenile system by delaying the filing of
charges until the juvenile has reached the age necessary to
become eligible for transfer, a practice which became so com-
mon that it earned the name "Texas style" waiver 44 after its firm
acceptance in the juvenile and appellate courts of that state.4 5
The Texas legislature has since enacted a statute46 which
specifies that the child must have attained the minimum age at
the time of the alleged offense before juvenile court jurisdiction
may be waived. However, the abuse is likely to continue, as
courts in jurisdictions determining the applicable age at the
time of charging or proceeding on the offense generally support
this method, basing their decisions on the wording of the
statute4 7 and on the theory that the existence of juvenile court
jurisdiction at the time of commission does not substantively
change the nature of the criminal offense.
48
Like the minimum age requirements, many statutes contain
minimum offense standards whereby eligibility for transfer de-
pends on the gravity of the offense charged. A few states allow
transfer only of cases involving specific crimes. In Connec-
ticut 49 only juveniles accused of murder may be tried as adults.
tana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.
42. Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin.
43. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 27.3178 (Supp. 1972) reads in part:
Where a child who has attained the age of 15 years so accused of any act
the nature of which constitutes a felony, the judge of probate ... may
waive jurisdiction pursuant to this section upon motion of the prosecut-
ing attorney, whereupon it shall be lawful to try such child in the court
having general criminal jurisdiction of such offense.
44. Schornhorst, supra note 14 at 600.
45. In Foster v. State, 400 S.W. 2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) a fifteen year
old was accused of auto theft and held in juvenile detention until he reached
seventeen, at which time he was charged with murder arising out of the same
incident.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54-02 (Vernon 1975).
47. State v. Little, 241 Or. 557, 407 P.2d 627 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 902
(1966). See Comment, 5 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 157 (1968).
48. See Annotation: 89 A.L.R. 2d 506 (1963). Also Miller v. Quatsoe, 348 F.
Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1972) which held that where age is fixed at the date of the
filing of a complaint, this filing cannot be delayed in order to avoid juvenile
court jurisdiction.
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-60a (1972).
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Montana 50 permits transfer involving various grave offenses
including possession of explosives and criminal sale of danger-
ous drugs for profit. However, a majority of states do not so
closely limit the instances in which transfer may occur. In thir-
teen jurisdictions 51 an accusation of any felony qualifies a child
for trial in criminal court. In twenty-two states,5 2 including
California, a charge of any crime-felony, misdemeanor or vio-
lation of a local ordinance-brings the transfer law into opera-
tion.
The purpose of the broad minimum offense requirement is
possibly to enhance the discretionary authority of the juvenile
court by bringing all cases involving criminal charges within its
transfer power. The practical effect, however, may be to height-
en the importance of the accused juvenile's age. The result is
that an older juvenile accused of a less serious offense but
approaching the juvenile court's age limit may be transferred
while his younger counterpart facing more serious charges may
not be.
Substantive Criteria
Attendant to its decision in Kent v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court quoted a policy memorandum of the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court, prepared in 1959, which set
forth guidelines5 3 to be considered by courts in deciding
50. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1229 (Supp. 1975).
51. District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah.
52. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, In-
diana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming.
53. The determining factors which will be considered by the judge in decid-
ing whether the juvenile court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived
are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, great-
er weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined
by consultation with the United States Attorney).
whether to waive jurisdiction over a child accused of crime.
These guidelines have been widely incorporated into the trans-
fer laws of the states, about half of which have enacted stand-
ards modeled upon or substantially similar to those set forth in
Kent.
Generally, the Kent guidelines and their progeny emphasize
the seriousness and nature of the alleged offense and the
amenability of the child to rehabilitation and treatment within
the juvenile system. Their purpose is the apparently neutral
goal of separating the child offender from the adult criminal, or
put another way, of selecting out the type of person the juvenile
system was not designed to treat. The theory behind these
guidelines is that a transferred juvenile should be the one not
likely to benefit from the approach and programs the system
offers, and thus a waiver of jurisdiction actually serves such
juvenile's interests. However, considered from the perspective
of the juvenile facing trial in criminal court, the aim of these
guidelines can only be to secure his punishment and society's
retribution for his alleged act. This follows logically from the
fundamental difference between the juvenile system and the
adult criminal process:
The only thing that criminal courts can do that juvenile courts cannot
do is put a child in the penitentiary to accomplish 'rehabilitation'
which the juvenile court felt it could not provide. Adult criminal
processes, however, conform the sentence to the crime. Sentences
therefore are determinant, and it is frequently said that determinant
sentences are anti-rehabilitative. This is certainly the case where chil-
dren are concerned, because it is the youngest who are always vic-
timized in prison; the weakest who are hurt by the strongest; and the
most innocent who are defiled by the most depraved. If they are not
exploited, they will certainly become more aggressive out of the need
for self-protection. It would seem, then, that since prison is not relied
upon to rehabilitate anyone, but simply 'to teach him a lesson,' the
transfer process is ultimately reduced to simple retribution.
54
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by con-
sideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern
of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous con-
tacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile
courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior
commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently avail-
able to the juvenile court.
383 U.S. 541, 556-557.
54. Stamm, supra note 9 at 146.
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This goal of retribution and punishment may be more clearly
seen by comparing the transfer laws to find whose interests, the
juvenile's or the community's, the legislature has designated for
the judge to consider in the decision whether to waive juris-
diction. Of the thirty-two states whose laws specifically include
this consideration5 5 , nineteen 56 require the court to look exclu-
sively to the interests of the community, while two 57 call atten-
tion to both the child and the community, and eight58 allow
regard to either. Only one state-Oregon-considers solely the
interests of the child in the transfer decision.
Another criticism of the guidelines set forth in Kent is that
while they attempt to make explicit what the juvenile court
judge is supposed to determine at the waiver hearing, they in
fact contain a variety of highly-subjective criteria which do little
to limit the judge's broad discretion. Statutory refinements of
Kent have been unable to correct this shortcoming.5 9 An exam-
ple of the vagueness inherent in these standards is the require-
ment that the child be amenable to the rehabilitative efforts of
the juvenile system. In short, the search for amenability relies
too heavily on the fallible conclusions of the probation officer
and behavioral scientists who investigate and report to the court
on the child's sophistication and maturity, his emotional at-
titude and disposition toward his environment.
The diagnosis and prognosis of a child's amenability to treatment is
delicate work, to say the least. Even where treatment is concerned,
diagnosis during the early stages is very tentative and may be proven
or disproven during the course of treatment. Prognosis is, therefore,
even more tentative, and one is forced to conjecture about how any
prognosis can be entertained in the absence of diagnosis and treat-
ment. Both develop and change over a period of time with the intake
of new data. They do not remain constant. However, behavioral scien-
tists have, as one writer put it, 'duped' everyone into believing that
55. California's transfer law does not (see note 21, supra).
56. Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
57. Georgia and Kentucky.
58. Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Utah, Wisconsin.
59. The standards contained in California's new transfer law (see note 21,
supra are criticized in Note, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: Substantive
View of the Fitness Decision, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 988 (1976). The waiver statute
of Texas has been cited as the best statutory effort yet. See Schornhorst, supra
note 14, at 604 note 127.
they can perform both these facts with certainty and almost on the
spot.6 0
Partly due to these weaknesses of the amenability test, the
transfer decision has become not "a scientific evaluation of
whether the youth will respond successfully to a juvenile court
disposition, but a front for society's insistence or retribution or
social protection."'61 Thus statutes embodying the Kent criteria
can become avenues for a juvenile court's abuse of discretion,
as where a judge elects transfer because of a community's de-
sire for retribution, rather than because the juvenile system
may be unsuited to the needs of a young offender.
62
Apart from its vagueness, the amenability standard is also
suspect because it almost always refers to treatment in avail-
able facilities.63 Conceivably, by reason of this qualification, a
child may suffer total deprivation of the treatment and re-
habilitative programs offered by the juvenile system due to the
state's failure to provide adequate facilities at the time the
transfer decision is made. This problem was brought to light in
a Minnesota case6 4 where a juvenile court found that "no pro-
gram exists or has been designed which can rehabilitate" the
child accused of armed robbery and "he is therefore not amen-
able to treatment as a juvenile and must be referred before
prosecution as an adult. '65 Reversing the decision of the
juvenile court, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found the pres-
ent unavailability of a program specifically designed for hard-
core, sophisticated, aggressive delinquents an insufficient basis
for transfer for adult court and remanded the case so the
juvenile court could search for alternative existing programs
and inquire into the feasibility of constructing an effective pro-
gram for the juvenile in question and others like him.66
In addition to the problem of a lack of available resources
there may also be a lack of resourcefulness on the part of
juvenile courts in conceiving of alternatives within the juvenile
system.6 7 That is, even where there may be facilities available, a
60. Stamm, supra note 9 at 162.
61. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 24
(1967).
62. Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable Validity of Exist-
ing Statutory Standards, 16 ST. Louis L. J. 604, 611 (1972).
63. In California the court must find that "the minor would not be amen-
able to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities
of the juvenile court..." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1972).
64. J.E.C. v. State, 225 N.W. 2d 245 (Minn. 1975).
65. Id. at 246.
B6. Id. at 243.
67. Note, Substantive View of the Fitness Decision, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
988, 1006 (1976).
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juvenile may be transferred because the judge or juvenile sys-
tem personnel were ignorant of or unreceptive to these alterna-
tive means of treatment. Instead of the general available
facilities requirement, there perhaps should be a requirement
that the court in its decision list the specific options for treating
the juvenile and state why each is inappropriate.6 8
Despite the shortcomings of the Kent guidelines, they at least
offer some statutory limitation on the discretion of the juvenile
court and some standards for reviewing the correctness of the
transfer decision. In many states the criteria governing the
transfer decision are so vague as to present no standards at all.
In Alabama, 69 for example, transfer is proper where the child
''cannot be made to lead a correct life and cannot be properly
disciplined" under the juvenile laws. Six states70 have standards
as amorphous as Alabama's. Five more provide only that trans-
fer may be ordered at the discretion of the judge,7 1 while four
states offer no standards or guidelines whatsoever beyond the
requirement that the hearing include a "full investigation" of
the facts pertaining to the transfer decision. 72 The result is that
juvenile judges must devise their own guidelines; and because
such standards are unavailable in printed form, the juvenile
and his counsel are handicapped in their preparation of a de-
fense at the transfer hearing.7 3 Not surprisingly, efforts have
been made to create clearer standards through the appellate
process, but the courts of these jurisdictions have generally
refused to supply them. Indeed, the courts of five states,74 at
least one from each of the three groups described above, have
68. In Atkins v. State, 290 N.E. 2d 441 (i972) the Supreme Court of Indiana
invalidated a waiver order failing to state reasons sufficient to permit meaning-
ful review, in part because the order did not justify waiver as the only alterna-
tive open to the juvenile court. See also People v. Joe T., 48 Cal. App. 3d 114
(1975) which held that certifying a minor to adult court without considering and
reejecting youth authority treatment in the record was an abuse of discretion.
69. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958).
70. Iowa, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, South Caroline, Utah.
71. Arkansas, Missouri, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington.
72. Florida, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island.
73. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 281, 314 (1967).
74. Lewis v. State, 86 Nev. 889,467 P.2d 114 (1970). Petition of Morin, 95 N.H.
518,68 A.2d 668 (1949), In re Bullard, 22 N.C. App. 245, 206 S.E.2d 305 (1974), State
v. Little, 241 Or. 557, 407 P.2d 627, cert. denied 385 U.S. 902 (1965), State in
Interest of Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (1974).
found their law sufficiently explicit to withstand constitutional
attacks on grounds of due process and equal protection. Only
occasionally has a court found a transfer statute deficient and
on its own fashioned a more detailed criteria, as did the Su-
preme Court of Idaho in State v. Gibbs.75 In that case, the Idaho
court expanded statutory language that the child must not be
"treatable in any available institution" to include a list of spe-
cific criteria that the juvenile court must consider before waiv-
ing jurisdiction.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER LAWS
Who Makes the Transfer Decision?
Although the decision to transfer is normally made by the
juvenile court, it may also fall to one of the other two parties
involved in the waiver procedure: the prosecuting authority or
the juvenile himself. Seven states7 6 and the federal government
specifically provide that the accused child may request trial as
an adult. But since the sixth amendment guarantees a jury trial
to every criminal defendant, these provisions may be superflu-
ous and merely underscore the harsh bargain a child faces in
choosing adult treatment; i.e., to obtain the full constitutional
safeguards attaching to a criminal trial, he must forfeit the
enormous benefits and privileges of juvenile status.77
Of greater significance is the prosecutor's role in the transfer
proceeding.7 8 It has already been shown how, under the legisla-
tive waiver statutes, the charging of certain offenses results in
the automatic and mandatory trial of the juvenile as an adult. In
such cases the legislature has in effect placed the transfer deter-
mination in the hands of the prosecutor, who decides whether to
accuse the child of one of these selected crimes. By choosing the
offense, the prosecutor at the same time selects for the child the
forum in which he will be tried. Under some statutes, the prose-
cutor need not charge a specific offense to invoke a particular
forum but is expressively given authority to choose between
75. 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972).
76. Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia.
77. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) found this
choice unconstitutional. Defendant, 16 years old, asserted his right to a jury
trial. The government contended that by seeking the sentencing and other
privileges of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, the defendant waived this
right. Held the Attorney General could not proceed against him as a juvenile
without affording him his constitutionally protected jury trial.
78. See generally, Mlyniec, Juvenile Delinquent or Adult Convict-The
Prosecutor's Choice, 14 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 29 (1976).
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juvenile and adult court in filing an accusation. In Nebraska,79
the county attorney may prosecute any child in the adult court
for any felony violation; in Wyoming80 the prosecutor may file in
the adult court for any criminal charge. Prosecutorial waiver
may also occur, as in Arkansas, 81 where the legislature makes
the criminal court's jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
juvenile court for certain classes of crimes. Regardless of the
legislative device, the result is clearly that the juvenile is de-
prived of a neutral exercise of discretion in the transfer deci-
sion. The ultimate decision is not based on statutory guidelines
and, in most cases, there is no appeal.82
Fortunately, however, there are indications of a trend away
from this method of effecting transfer. There have been enacted
in recent years no new laws significantly broadening the prose-
cutor's role in the waiver proceedings. To the contrary, Illinois
and the federal government have repealed their prosecutorial
choice laws, while Nebraska has legislation pending which
would restore the waiver decision to the juvenile court.83
Procedure in the Transfer Hearings
Most legislatures have attempted to include the procedural
rights found applicable to the transfer hearing in Kent v. United
States84 within their transfer statutes. However, because the
Kent opinion did not make clear whether its holding was of
constitutional dimension or applied only to waiver hearings
within the District of Columbia where the case arose, these
rights have not been universally applied. Indeed, as of 1974,
79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202.01 (1971).
80. WYO. STAT. § 14-115.4 (Supp. 1975).
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-405, 45-420 (Supp. 1975).
82. Courts have consistently found that the prosecutor's decision whether
to proceed against a child in juvenile or adult court is no different from the
decision to seek or not seek an indictment or charge a greater or lesser offense,
therefore it is within the traditional scope of prosecutorial discretion. Cox v.
United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Div. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973);
Bland v. U.S., 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973). This
concept that the prosecutor's choice is an executive and not a judicial function
should not apply to the certification process because the choice terminates
rather than initiates that process. See Mlyniec, supra note 78 at 46.
83. Note, Juvenile Court Reform: The Juvenile Offender After L.B. 620, 54
NEB. L. REV. 405 (1975).
84. See notes 11-13, supra, and their accompanying text.
eighteen states did not statutorily require that a child be af-
forded a hearing before the juvenile court waived jurisdiction.8 "
Through legislative amendment or court decision 86 that number
has today been reduced to eight.87 Evidently, in these states a
juvenile may be transferred without ever having had an oppor-
tunity to present a defense on the issue of transfer.
The laws of the thirty-nine states mandating a waiver hearing
vary widely as to notice requirements. In eleven jurisdictions
there is no statutory requirement that the child be given notice
of the hearing, nor has such provision generally been read into
these statutes by the courts. While this is no basis for the conclu-
sion that notice of the waiver hearing is never supplied in these
states, it at least illustrates the remiss approach often taken by
legislatures toward the due process rights of the juvenile in the
certification procedure. Additionally, most notice requirements
provide that the accused be informed of the date and place of
hearing only three days in advance. 88 Several states require five
days notice, and in Montana and Louisiana,89 the accused is
afforded at least ten days preparation for this most important
proceeding. At least ten 90 jurisdictions further require that the
notice advise the child and his parents or guardian of the pur-
pose of the transfer proceeding and courts have strictly en-
forced this requirement, holding that failure to observe it will
invalidate the hearing.9 1
As evidenced by its lack of provision for a separate, noticed
hearing, the California transfer law is not a model of the statu-
tory protections and rights to be afforded an accused child. For
example, it does not grant a right to assistance of counsel, al-
though in this respect it is far from exceptional: only three
85. Levin and Sarri, supra note 2 at 21 (1974).
86. In California the hearing on certification was made mandatory in
Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592 (1972). This state's new certification
statute still does not necessitate a transfer hearing.
87. Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, South
Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin.
88. This may be insufficient time to prepare for the complex issues that
often arise at the waiver hearing, hence a denial of due process. Packel, A Guide
to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law, 21 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1, 19 (1975).
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.1(3) (West 1951); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
10-1229(c) (Supp. 1975).
90. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tex-
as, Virginia, Wyoming.
91. E.g., Reed v. State, 125 Ga. App. 568, 188 S.E.2d 392 (1972), State v. Gibbs,
94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972) (invalidating transfer where the summons to the
child and his parents for interviews for the investigative report did not state
nature and purpose of the proceeding).
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states92 expressly grant this right in their transfer statutes.
Where it exists, this right is often established through court
decision, 93 or is found elsewhere in the juvenile code, as in
California.94 More often the transfer laws speak to a corollary
right established in Kent, that the child's counsel have access to
the social records and probation reports considered by the
juvenile court at the hearing. Eight jurisdictions95 confer this
right by statute. The Deleware law96 represents its minimal ex-
pression, providing for access before or at the commencement
of a hearing; other laws, like Arizona's, 97 assure access at least
before the hearing, while two states98 extend the right by permit-
ting cross-examination of the authors of the reports.
Another protection not found in the California statute but
appearing in the statutes of at least fifteen99 jurisdictions is the
requirement that the juvenile court must find probable or rea-
sonable cause that the child committed the unlawful act before
it may proceed with the transfer hearing. A concern for the
juvenile's civil liberties as well as his privilege of treatment
within the juvenile system suggests that a court should take the
drastic measure of waiver of jurisdiction only after it has at
least determined reasonable grounds to believe that the child
has committed the offense.
Because the waiver process subjects a juvenile to adult criminal pro-
ceedings, the basis for the waiver should include the criteria that are
of paramount importance in the adult system. In other words, the first
question to be determined by the criminal judge is probable cause,
and therefore, probable cause should be examined in waiver proce-
dures. Many juvenile statutes do not guarantee probable cause hear-
92. DEL. FAM. CT. R. 170(c) (1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.3 (West
1951); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 27.3178(5) (Supp. 1972).
93. E.g., Powell v. Sheriff of Clark County, 85 Nev. 684, 462 P.2d 756 (1969).
94. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634 (West 1972). Also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-1-106 (Supp. 1969).
95. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas, Michigan,
North Carolina, Texas, Virginia. Again, in California the right was created by
the Supreme Court. Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 592, 598, 498 P.2d
1098, 1101, 102 Cal. Rptr. 850, 853 (1972).
96. DEL. FAM. CT. R. 170(c) (1974).
97. ARIZ. JUV. CT. R. 12 (Supp. 1971).
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-108(3) (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. § 38.808(b) (Supp.
1971).
99. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia,
Wyoming.
ings and. . . suitability for treatment (becomes) a major, or the sole,
basis for transfer in many states.
10 0
Significantly, courts have often held that rules of evidence at
such probable cause hearings may be considerably relaxed. In
Alaska, Indiana and Washington the juvenile court may admit
hearsay; 10 1 Arizona, on the other hand, comparing the juvenile
court proceeding to a preliminary examination in adult court,
requires that a probable cause determination be founded upon
competent evidence to the same extent as any other formal
hearing. 102
It may be noted also that in three states the probable cause
determination regarding commission of the offense must by
statute be conducted in a separate hearing. 10 3 The practical re-
sult may be that the probable cause requirement becomes an
invitation to plea bargaining, as where the juvenile stipulates to
probable cause in exchange for reduced charges or the with-
drawal of the motion to transfer. 10 4
Related to the issue of the degree of proof is the question of
who bears the burden of showing whether or not transfer
should occur. Reviewing courts have consistently placed the
burden upon the state, reasoning that because the juvenile sys-
tem exists for the benefit of the child, the state must show that
the particular individual would not benefit from treatment
within the system. In an Indiana decision 10 5 the court relied on
the statement of purpose of the Indiana juvenile code 10 6 to find a
statutory presumption that a child is to be treated within the
juvenile system, that waiver is exceptional and must explicitly
appear in the record as an alternative of last resort. 10 7 Other
100. LEVIN & SARRI, supra note 2 at 22. The courts of many states whose laws
do not call for a showing of probable cause have found this not to be a violation
of due process. E.g., In re Murphy 15 Md. App. 434, 291 A.2d 867 (1971), Stephen-
son v. State, 204 Kan. 80, 460 P.2d 442 (1970).
101. In re P.H., 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d 859
(Ind. App. 1974); In re Sheppard v. Rhay, 73 W.D. 2d 739 (1968). Contra, In re
Brown, 183 N.W. 2d 731 (Iowa 1971). (Holding that juvenile court must exclude
evidence not found in the record unless it is subject to objection and cross-
examination. But the "record" may include an investigative report on the child's
amenability to treatment which is often full of hearsay and conclusions, and
Iowa law does not permit the child to cross-examine the author of that report.
102. In re Anonymous, 14 Ariz. App. 466, 484 P.2d 235 (1971).
103. Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina.
104. Note, Juvenile Justice in Arizona: A Special Project, 16 ARIz. L. REV.
203, 311 (1974).
105. Atkins v. State, 290 N.W.2d 441 (Ind. 1972).
106. See note 8, supra.
107. Atkins interpreted a statute which suggested that sometimes the burden
shifts to the juvenile to show that transfer is inappropriate. The statute provided
that children fourteen or older charged with any crime may be transferred if
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jurisdictions have not taken the state's burden this far. One
California decision, for example, has held that the state need
not demonstrate affirmatively that none of the various treat-
ment options available within the juvenile court system would
be adequate to serve the child's needs. The court stated that "We
do not believe that the state is required to bear so heavy a
burden before the juvenile court can determine that a minor is
unfit to be treated as a juvenile.' 10 8 A Pennsylvania court' 9 has
held that a juvenile charged with murder has the burden to
show that he does not belong in criminal court and that he needs
and is amenable to the rehabilitative programs of the juvenile
system. However, such cases are rare, and juvenile courts may
be expected to continue to fix the burden of proof on the state.
A procedural protection which the California statute does
include is that the transfer decision must precede the attach-
ment of jeopardy"0 in the adjudication of the juvenile's guilt as
to delinquency or criminal charges. This provision incorporates
the rule announced in Breed v. Jones"' that the double jeopar-
dy clause of the fifth amendment is fully applicable in juvenile
court proceedings. Even before Breed only Alabama, Mas-
sachusetts and West Virginia required that the child be ad-
judicated a delinquent before transfer could occur." 2 Today the
the offense was heinous or of an aggravated character or part of a repetitive
pattern of offenses; but for children sixteen or older charged with one of a
variety of serious crimes, the court shall order transfer unless certain circum-
stances appear, e.g., the case has no specific prosecutive merit. IND. CODE ANN. §
31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1972).
108. People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 139, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420, 429
(1975). See also, J.T.P. v. State, 544 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1975), which stopped short of
affirmatively placing the burden on the state, finding merely that the state may
not rely on a presumption that a serious offender is not receptive to rehabilita-
tive treatment.
109. Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101 (Pa. Supp. 1975).
110. In a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is empanneled and
sworn. Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). In a trial without a jury,
double jeopardy arises when the court begins to take evidence. Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684 (1949).
111. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
112. 421 U.S. at 539, note 19. Breed overrules the Alabama decisions requir-
ing that adjudication precede transfer, Rudolph v. State, 286 Ala. 189, 238 So. 2d
542 (1970). Alabama's statute does not fix the point at which transfer must occur.
Massachusetts and West Virginia have pending curative legislation. See Note, 11
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 169 (1976), Note, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 428 (1976).




The twenty-one states which follow the standards for transfer
suggested in Kent consider the juvenile's record and history of
contacts with the juvenile and law enforcement authorities as a
major criterion at the transfer hearing. In many other remain-
ing states whose laws more generally direct the juvenile court to
weigh the safety of the community, the juvenile's record and
history of contact also become a matter of important con-
sideration. Thus, a juvenile who, once having been transferred
to criminal court, again finds himself accused of crime during
his minority may well expect his recidivism to count heavily
against him in any subsequent transfer hearing.
In a survey among nearly two hundred juvenile court judges
to determine what considerations ought to be undertaken at the
transfer hearing, the juvenile's record and prior contacts with
the police, the court and other official agencies was the second
most frequently mentioned criterion, following only the serious-
ness of the offense.114 Six states have adopted in their transfer
laws provisions designed to deal severely with the recidivist. In
Rhode Island and Delaware"' waiver of jurisdiction is perma-
nent: once transferred, a child must be prosecuted as an adult
for all future offenses, regardless of their nature. The Kansas
statute'16 permits the judge to make the original waiver order
applicable to any subsequent unlawful act. The remaining
laws 17 direct the judge to summarily review the recidivist's case
before transferring him to the adult court, but none provide for
a hearing and only Oregon requires the judge to reconsider any
of the usual criteria, e.g., amenability to treatment with the
juvenile system.
113. New Mexico's statute [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-27 (Supp. 1974)] has been
praised for its thoroughness in protecting the juvenile from double jeopardy,
while Florida's [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5) (West Supp. 1972)] has been cited as a
similar but faulty attempt at effective legislation. Whitebread and Batey,
Juvenile Double Jeopardy, 63 GEO. L. J. 857, 864-69 (1975).
114. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME,
Appendix B, Table 5 (1967).
115. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (Supp. 1971); DEL. FAM. CT. R. 170 (1974).
116. KAN. STAT. § 38.808 (Supp. 1971).
117. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-22 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-16
(Supp. 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.533 (1971).
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Appeal
In view of the extreme importance of the certification pro-
ceeding and of the highly subjective nature of the juvenile
court's decision, it would seem obvious that adequate review
should be made available to a transferred child. Yet far too
often the procedures for review are unsatisfactory, mainly be-
cause the majority of states do not permit immediate and direct
appeal from the juvenile court, but require the accused to await
the outcome of the criminal trial. Consequently, not only has the
child already lost the privileges of juvenile status-e.g., anonym-
ity, limitation of confinement to the period of minority' 18-but in
certain instances the mere passage of time will prevent him
from re-entering the juvenile system, making appeal meaning-
less at best. 1 9
Fifteen states 120 provide that only "final orders" are appeal-
able from the juvenile court. It thus falls to the judiciary to
interpret whether a transfer order is final. Generally, courts
have held it is not final on the grounds that certification is but a
single step in the criminal process and errors in that step can be
effectively reviewed, in consolidation with all other issues, in
the direct appeal from the criminal conviction. 12'
At least four states,122 on the other hand, provide by statute
that the transfer decision is a final order, and therefore may be
immediately and directly appealed. The California statute is
silent on the issue, yet it has been held that the waiver determi-
nation, although not appealable, may be reviewed by writ.
23
Regardless of the form, it should be clear that
118. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556-557 (1966).
119. In a recent Texas case a sixteen-year-old boy appealed an order certify-
ing him to the criminal court. The court of appeal held that certification was
improper, but found itself unable to remand the case to the juvenile court
because the defendant had turned seventeen and fell outside the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. Hight v. State, 487 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Supp. 1972). See also, Note, 4
ST. MARY's L.J. 405 (1972).
120. District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Virginia.
121. Commonwealth v. Owens, 435 Pa. 96, 254 A.2d 639 (1969); contra, State
v. Yoss, 20 Ohio App. 2d 46, 251 N.E.2d 680 (1967).
122. Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, Oregon.
123. People v. Browing, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1975).
Appeal procedures in cases where the juvenile court has waived its
jurisdiction must be swift and efficient. It does little to enhance a
juvenile's contention that his case should be handled in a juvenile
court if he passes the jurisdictional age limit for the juvenile courts
while his case is on appeal. Further, there is little the juvenile court
can do to rehabilitate or control an older individual. The entire
rationale of the juvenile court system is defeated if the appeal is not
handled expeditiously.1 2 4
Preservation of Juvenile Rights
An encouraging trend in legislation related to waiver of juris-
diction is the effect to preserve to juveniles some of the
privileges of juvenile status in the event of transfer; California
Law is exemplary. 125 Section 707.2 prohibits in most cases the
incarceration of a person under eighteen years old in the state
prison. Under Section 707.3 where criminal charges are dis-
missed or found to be untrue in the adult court, then further
proceedings, if any must occur in juvenile court. Similarly, in
the District of Columbia, 126 jurisdiction of the juvenile court is
automatically restored in the absence of a guilty plea or verdict
in the adult court. Iowa, Kansas and Wyoming 127 permit the
return of a convicted child to the juvenile court for purposes of
124. Mountford and Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of
the Juvenile Court, 18 KAN. L. REV. 55, 68 (1969).
125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 707.2,707.4 (West Supp. 1976). §702.2. Except
as provided in Sections 1731.5 and 1737.1, no minor who was under the age of 18
years when he committed any criminal offense, and who has been found not a fit
and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law pursuant to
Section 707, shall be sentenced to the state prison, except upon petition filed
pursuant to Article 5 (commencing with Section 1780) of Division 2.5. Of those
persons eligible for commitment to the Youth Authority, prior to sentence the
court may remand such persons to the custody of the California Youth Authori-
ty not to exceed 90 days for the purpose of evaluation and report.
With the exception of past or present wards of the authority, no person shall
be returned to the court by the authority unless he has been remanded to the
Youth Authority for diagnosis and report, and personally evaluated.
§ 707.4. In any case arising under this article in which there is no conviction
in the criminal court and the minor is not returned to juvenile court pursuant to
Section 707.3, the clerk of the criminal court shall report such disposition to the
juvenile court, to the probation department, to the law enforcement agency
which arrested the minor for the offense which resulted in his remand to crim-
inal court, and to the Department of Justice. Unless the minor has had a prior
conviction in a criminal court, the clerk of the criminal court shall deliver to the
clerk of the juvenile court all copies of the minor's record in criminal court and
shall obliterate the minor's name from any index or minute book maintained in
the criminal court. The clerk of the juvenile court shall maintain the minor's
criminal court record as provided by Article 13 (commencing with Section 825)
of this chapter until such time as the juvenile court may issue an order that they
be sealed pursuant to Section 781.
126. D.C. CODE § 16-2307(h) (Supp. 1972).
127. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.72 (West 1969); KAN. STAT. § 38.808 (Supp. 1971);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-115-38 (Supp. 1971).
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disposition, and the Iowa statute expressly authorizes the con-
victing court to set aside a guilty plea or conviction if the
juvenile has successfully served one year's probation.
California also attempts to restore the anonymity of the
juvenile proceeding by requiring the expungement and sealing
of the minor's criminal record in cases where no conviction was
obtained in adult court.128 Alaska 129 goes even further in this
respect and allows for sealing of records even where the minor
was convicted, provided he has completed his sentence and the
convicting court is satisfied that the punishment assessed has
had its intended rehabilitative effect.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to provide an overview of the statutes
governing transfer of juvenile court jurisdiction in the United
States. The existence of these laws points to the failure of the
juvenile justice system to realize the principles upon which it
was founded. Recent efforts to change the laws to achieve a
more successful system indicate trends in conflict. In one direc-
tion are statutes designed to protect the rights and preserve the
privileges of the juvenile: the application of the double jeopardy
clause, the beginnings of a move away from prosecutorial dis-
cretion, and most significant of all, restoration of the benefits of
the juvenile system should the child be found innocent of crime,
or if guilty, should he achieve rehabilitation through treatment
as an adult. On the other hand, the broader impression to be
gained from the present state of the waiver statutes is that
transfer is as easy to obtain now as ever before and is becoming
increasingly easier. The maintenance of broad categories of
crimes under which transfer is permissible and numerous spe-
cific offenses under which it is mandatory; the broad discretion
128. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707-3 (West Supp. 1976). Whenever any
charge, the alleged circumstances and gravity of which were relied upon pur-
suant to Section 707, is dismissed or found untrue by the court of criminal
jurisdiction, the minor shall be returned to juvenile court for trial or disposition
of any lesser charge which may remain outstanding against him if the minor
consents to being returned to the juvenile court. In any other case, the minor
may be returned to juvenile court for the trial or disposition of any charge
pending against him if he consents to being returned to the juvenile court. If
jeopardy has attached in the criminal proceeding, the case shall not be returned
until a verdict or finding has been made as to each pending charge.
129. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (1971).
of the juvenile court judge made even broader by the persistent
vagueness of the transfer criteria, and by the absence of a prob-
able cause standard in the application of these criteria, evidence
this trend.13° Although these trends are not necessarily incom-
patible, in order to achieve harmony the former must keep pace
with the latter. That is, the statutes must show a greater concern
for the rights of the accused child, a recognition that the impor-
tance of the transfer decision is more than "critical", it is abso-
lute. This may be achieved, for example, by observing formal
rules of evidence at the transfer hearing, or by providing a right
of immediate and direct appellate review of the waiver decision.
130. See, THOMPSON, 1 JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK, 151 (1972).
